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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DUSTIN SCOTT GLANDON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48131-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-20-10425

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Dustin Scott Glandon failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two and one half years fixed, upon
his convictions for felony domestic violence?
ARGUMENT
Glandon Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The state charged Glandon with attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence, and

injury to a child. (R., pp.58-59.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Glandon pled guilty to felony
domestic violence. (R., pp.60-72; Tr., p.8, L.15 – p.18, L.19.) In exchange, the state agreed to
1

dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a suspended sentence of ten years, with three
years fixed, and a period of probation. (R., pp.71-72.)
During the change of plea hearing, the district court asked Glandon whether he understood
that the court could sentence him “up to the maximum allowed by statute, which is ten years in the
state penitentiary” even though the state was bound by the terms of the plea agreement to
recommend probation. (Tr., p.13, L.21 – p.14, L.1.) Glandon confirmed that he understood. (Tr.,
p.14, L.2.)
During sentencing, both parties requested a suspended ten-year sentence, with three years
fixed, and probation. (Tr., p.22, Ls.11-21, p.25, L.18 – p.27, L.12.) The court imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with two and one half years fixed. (R., pp.79-82; Tr., p.34, L.17 – p.35,
L.1.) Glandon timely appealed. (R., pp.84-86.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citations omitted). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citation omitted). Where a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker,
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citation omitted). When a trial court’s discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera,
164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
2

C.

Glandon Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten

years, with two and one half years fixed. To carry the burden of demonstrating an abuse of
discretion, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining
whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the
decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the executive branch,
presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey,
161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391).
To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds
could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A
sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’”
Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368
P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
As a preliminary matter, Glandon’s sentence fits within the statutory maximum. Felony
domestic violence is punishable by “imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed ten
(10) years.” Idaho Code § 18-918(2). The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with two and one half years fixed. (R., pp.79-82.) Because his sentence fits within the statutory
limit, Glandon “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).
He cannot do so.
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The district court imposed a reasonable sentence. As the district court correctly observed,
Glandon’s conduct in this case did not merit a sentence of probation. (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-14. 1)
Glandon admitted that he punched his wife in her stomach and then put her in a stranglehold. (PSI,
p.4.) As a result, his wife experienced difficulty breathing, stiffness in her neck, and a scratch and
swelling on her jaw and cheek. (PSI, p.3.) Their

son was present at the time of this

incident and attempted to stop Glandon by jumping on his back, but Glandon threw him onto a
nearby couch. (PSI, p.3.) The court found that Glandon’s conduct “not only significantly
negatively impacted his spouse … but also his

son who had to do what five year olds

shouldn’t have to: One, which is to see their mommy being struck and beaten by a daddy and,
two, feel the need to intervene to try to stop daddy.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-24.)
Additionally, the district court considered the necessary sentencing objectives in
fashioning Glandon’s sentence.

(Tr., p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.7.)

The district court properly

considered “the protection of the community, including the victim … or any person who may be
in a domestic relationship with [Glandon], as the foremost important factor.” (Tr., p.31, L.22 –
p.32, L.2.) In determining how best to achieve the goals of sentencing, the court addressed
Glandon’s troubling history of domestic violence. (Tr., p.32, Ls.14-22; see PSI, pp.4-7.) In 2012,
Glandon received a withheld judgment for misdemeanor domestic battery. (PSI, pp.4-6.) In 2018,
Glandon was convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery or assault in the presence of a child and
disturbing the peace. (PSI, pp.5-7.) The dispositions of those cases provided Glandon “multiple
opportunities for treatment for domestic violence, including the Domestic Violence Court
program, as well as … domestic violence probation that included the domestic violence counseling

1

The decision whether to place Glandon on probation or impose a term of imprisonment was “not
even close, in the Court’s view.” (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-14.)
4

and weekly treatment.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.14-22; PSI, pp.6-7.) However, far from being rehabilitated
by those treatment programs, the court found evidence that Glandon “used the information that he
ha[d] received in treatment in part to manipulate the victim further.” (Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.16.)
Furthermore, despite receiving what the court characterized as “probably the best treatment
available for domestic violence” (Tr., p.33, Ls.1-9), the domestic violence evaluation revealed that
Glandon remained a “high risk” to reoffend (PSI, pp.19, 25; Tr., p.33, Ls.13-16). Accordingly,
the court correctly concluded that even “[t]he best treatment doesn’t seem to work,” rejected the
recommendation to place him on probation, and imposed a term of incarceration consistent with
the pre-sentence investigator’s recommendation. (Tr., p.34, L.2 – p.35, L.1.) In light of Glandon’s
underlying conduct, his history of domestic violence and failed treatment, and his high risk of
recidivism, the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable to achieve the objectives of
sentencing.
Glandon argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to place him on
probation in light of certain mitigating factors. (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) Specifically, Glandon
points to such mitigating factors as his prior military service; substance abuse; expression of
remorse; and support from family, friends, and a past employer. (Id.)
-- However, he has failed to
show how any of these mitigating factors, whether considered individually or collectively, entitle
him to a term of probation.
The court district considered each of these mitigating factors when it rejected the
recommendation for a period of probation at the time of sentencing. In determining an appropriate
sentence, the district court expressly considered the PSI materials, which contained the relevant
information regarding Glandon’s military service, substance abuse, and familial and community
support. (Tr., p.32, Ls.8-13; PSI, pp.8-21.) The court also considered the defendant’s expression
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of remorse. (Tr., p.30, L.6 – p.31, L.14, p.32, Ls.8-13.) Thus, even if this Court disagrees with
the amount of weight the district court gave to this mitigating information, “[i]n deference to the
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). Thus, Glandon has failed to show that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.
In sum, the district court imposed a reasonable sentence that fit within the statutory limit
and was intended to achieve the goals of sentencing, particularly the protection of society.
Glandon has failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 29th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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